

# Chapter 3–3

## Key Distribution

# Key Management

- public-key encryption helps address key distribution problems
- have two aspects of this:
  - distribution of public keys
  - use of public-key encryption to distribute secret keys

# Distribution of Public Keys

- can be considered as using one of:
  - public announcement
  - publicly available directory
  - public-key authority
  - public-key certificates


# Public Announcement

- Users distribute public keys to recipients or broadcast to community at large
  - eg. append PGP keys to email messages or post to news groups or email list
- Major weakness is forgery
  - anyone can create a key claiming to be someone else and broadcast it
  - until forgery is discovered can masquerade as claimed user

# Publicly Available Directory

- can obtain greater security by registering keys with a public directory
- directory must be trusted with properties:
  - contains {name, public-key} entries
  - participants register securely with directory
  - participants can replace key at any time
  - directory is periodically published
  - directory can be accessed electronically
- still vulnerable to tampering or forgery(변경/위조)


# Publicly Available Directory



# Public–Key Authority

- improve security by tightening control over distribution of keys from directory
- has properties of directory
- and requires users to know public key for the directory
- then users interact with directory to obtain any desired public key securely
  - does require real–time access to directory when keys are needed

# Public-Key Authority




$\text{N}_1$  ,  $\text{N}_2$  : nonce that is used to identify this transaction uniquely



# Public–Key Certificates

- certificates allow key exchange without real–time access to public–key authority
- a certificate binds **identity** to **public key**
  - usually with other info such as period of validity, rights of use etc
- with all contents **signed** by a trusted Public–Key or Certificate Authority (CA)
- can be verified by anyone who knows the public–key authority’s public key

# Public-Key Certificates



Exchange of Public-Key Certificates

$$Dku_{auth}[C_A] = Dku_{auth}[Eku_{auth}[T, ID_A, KU_a]] = (T, ID_A, KU_a)$$


# Public–Key Distribution of Secret Keys

- use previous methods to obtain public–key
- can use for secrecy or authentication
- but public–key algorithms are slow
- so usually want to use private–key encryption to protect message contents
- hence need a session key
- have several alternatives for negotiating a suitable session

# Simple Secret Key Distribution


- proposed by Merkle in 1979
  - A generates a new temporary public key pair
  - A sends B the public key and their identity
  - B generates a session key  $K$  sends it to A encrypted using the supplied public key
  - A decrypts the session key and both use
- problem is that an opponent can intercept and impersonate both halves of protocol

# Simple Secret Key Distribution



# Public-Key Distribution of Secret Keys

- if have securely exchanged public-keys  
:



# Diffie–Hellman Key Exchange

- first public–key type scheme proposed
- by Diffie & Hellman in 1976 along with the exposition of public key concepts
  - note: now know that **Williamson** (UK CESG) secretly proposed the concept in 1970
- is a practical method for public exchange of a secret key
- used in a number of commercial products

# Diffie–Hellman Key Exchange

- a public–key distribution scheme
  - cannot be used to exchange an arbitrary message
  - rather it can establish a common key
  - known only to the two participants
- value of key depends on the participants (and their private and public key information)



# Diffie–Hellman Setup

- all users agree on global parameters:
  - large prime integer or polynomial  $q$
  - $a$  being a primitive root mod  $q$
- each user (eg.  $A$ ) generates their key
  - chooses a secret key (number):  $x_A < q$
  - compute their **public key**:  $y_A = a^{x_A} \text{ mod } q$
- each user makes public key  $y_A$

# Diffie–Hellman Key Exchange

- shared session key for users A & B is  $K_{AB}$ :  
$$K_{AB} = a^{x_A \cdot x_B} \bmod q$$
$$= y_A^{x_B} \bmod q \quad (\text{which } \mathbf{B} \text{ can compute})$$
$$= y_B^{x_A} \bmod q \quad (\text{which } \mathbf{A} \text{ can compute})$$
- $K_{AB}$  is used as session key in private–key encryption scheme between Alice and Bob
- if Alice and Bob subsequently communicate, they will have the **same** key as before, unless they choose new public–keys

# Diffie-Hellman Example

- users Alice & Bob who wish to swap keys:
- agree on prime  $q=353$  and  $a=3$
- select random secret keys:
  - A chooses  $x_A=97$ , B chooses  $x_B=233$
- compute respective public keys:
  - $y_A=3^{97} \bmod 353 = 40$  (Alice)
  - $y_B=3^{233} \bmod 353 = 248$  (Bob)
- compute shared session key as:
  - $K_{AB}=y_B^{x_A} \bmod 353 = 248^{97} = 160$  (Alice)
  - $K_{AB}=y_A^{x_B} \bmod 353 = 40^{233} = 160$  (Bob)

# Key Exchange Protocols

- users could create random private/public D–H keys each time they communicate
- users could create a known private/public D–H key and publish in a directory, then consulted and used to securely communicate with them
- both of these are vulnerable to a meet-in-the-Middle Attack
- authentication of the keys is needed